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Within much contemporary social ontology there is a particular methodology at work. 
This methodology takes as a starting point two or more asocial or atomic individuals. 
These individuals are taken to be perfectly functional agents, though outside of all social 
relations. following this, combinations of these individuals are considered, to deduce what 
constitutes a social group. here i will argue that theories which rely on this methodology 
are always circular, so long as they purport to describe the formation of all social 
groups, as they must always presuppose a pre-existing collectivity. Such methodology 
also produces various distortions in our theories, such as voluntarism. i focus on the 
workings of Plural Subject Theory as laid out by margaret gilbert in on social Facts 
(1989). i show that the formation of a plural subject always requires communication, and 
that communication always requires a pre-existing collectivity. i examine the elements 
within Plural Subject Theory which protect gilbert from these accusations of circularity, 
and argue against them. I finalise by suggesting that what Plural Subject Theory, 
and social ontology in general, requires as a theoretical starting point is not atomic 
individuals and their combinations, but rather combinations of already socialised or 
embedded individuals. 
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“a brief hypothetical account of the transition from the state of nature to a 
social state ... first nature (or god) produced a rational or reasoning being. 
Such being moves by virtue of acts of will ... This being was endowed with ideas 
of its own desires such that ‘i want a drink’ was understood to provide reason 
to move towards a drink. now more than one being of this kind was produced. 
What ideas could these beings be endowed with that might enable them to live 
together harmoniously?” 
(gilbert 1989, 414).
theorisation necessitates abstraction: to gain traction on the messiness and 
complexities of reality we must abstract away from it. not all abstraction 
is legitimate however, and one must be assured in an investigation 
that the chosen abstractions do not distort the aspect of reality under 
examination. this paper argues that such a distortion is at work within 
the methodology most common in contemporary analytic philosophy of 
society. the abstraction in question is neatly demonstrated in the epigraph: 
though its story is “crude” it is none the less taken to “make sense” (osF, 
415). such methodology relies on the assumption that one can legitimately 
abstract away from society a primordial atomic individual, and then see  what 
combinations of these individuals create a social group.
“Methodological Individualism” was first suggested by Weber as a scientific 
and “un-ideological” basis of a science of society (Weber 1922/1978, 13-
16). it was simply the assertion that society should be understood via 
the intentions, actions and beliefs of individuals. in actual fact, the 
methodology at work within much contemporary philosophy of society is 
more akin to methodological atomism understood in a hobbesian sense, 
which see s human beings as capable of coming into full maturity outside 
of any societal interaction (hobbes 1651/2003, 102). Whether individualism 
or atomism the important methodological assumptions i am questioning 
are these: (i) that we can feasibility consider an asocial human agent as our 
primary unit of investigation, and (ii) that we can consider combinations 
of these individuals to deduce what is intuitively required to produce a 
“social group”. With these methodological commitments, the main question 
of societal philosophy becomes: “What makes a collectivity out of a sum of 
living beings?” (gilbert 1989, 2).
I take it that, by definition, the majority of “summative accounts” take this 
methodology to be correct. summative accounts argue that all talk of groups 
can be reduced to talk of individuals, and that groups don’t really exist as 
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anything other than a combination of individuals1 . methodological atomism 
makes the summative theory of groups very plausible – a methodology that 
places such weight on the atomic individual will be more likely to produce 
an individualistic ontology of society as an output.  in this paper however, i 
focus exclusively on the “Plural subject theory” (Pst) forwarded by margaret 
gilbert. Pst is a rarity: a non-summative account of social groups achieved 
through investigative atomism of the kind sketched above. a plural subject 
is a kind of collective intentionality, a subject made by a “unity”, a “pool or 
sum of wills dedicated, as one, to a certain ‘cause’’’ (gilbert 1989, 409). Plural 
subject-hood is not reducible to the singular intentionality of the persons so 
connected2. i focus on gilbert’s account precisely for this reason, for i take it 
that if i can show that gilbert’s non-individualistic account shows distortions 
due to her atomistic methodology, then summative accounts certainly will. in 
particular, focus will be on gilbert’s On Social facts (1989), which stands as the 
formation and bedrock of Pst3. 
Finally, i must indicate the nature of the distortion such methodology creates. 
here i focus mainly on a distortion which can be called voluntarism within 
gilbert’s theory. as shall be shown, the methodology at work leads gilbert 
to investigate almost exclusively small voluntaristic groups of two or three 
people, who perceive themselves to be a unit. examples include mushroom 
pickers (gilbert 1989: 36-41), social travellers (gilbert 1989, 161-164) and – 
importantly – conversers (gilbert 1989,  433). gilbert takes these small groups 
as “paradigmatic” of all social groups (gilbert 1990), and as the origins and 
beginnings of all larger groups (gilbert 1989,  235)4. the formation of these 
groups are the formation of plural subjects (see  §2). thus the conclusions 
drawn from investigating these small, voluntaristic groups can be extended 
to all social groups (gilbert 1989,  149). gilbert accepts this voluntaristic nature 
as a necessary part of Pst: “if there is a plural subject, then each set of persons 
has volunteered his will for a sum of wills” (gilbert 1989,  413, emphasis mine). 
see ing as all social groups are plural subjects (gilbert 1989, 204, 233), this 
means all social groups are voluntaristic. this leads to odd theoretical
1  summative accounts include Quinton (1976), Keeley (1981) and Bratman (1999). see  gilbert 
(1989, 257-288)  for discussion on the nature of summative accounts in relation to a plural subject 
account.
2  Plural subjects will be better defined in section 2. Gilbert forms PST against the 
assumptions of “singularism”, which see s individual intentionality and agency as the only kind 
of intentionality and agency there can be (gilbert 1989, 12).
3  readers will be referred to more recent examples of gilbert’s work when necessary.
4  gilbert maintains this dedication to the importance of small groups in more recent work 
(gilbert 1990; 2000, 14-36; 2008, chapter 6). due to the methodology under question, such small units 
of investigation are common in contemporary philosophy of society (see Bratman 1999, 93-108).
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conclusions such that we can always leave a group (gilbert 1989, 426), and that 
those in power are always somehow representative of the people (gilbert 1989, 
206). gilbert admits and highlights this conception of society with frequent 
comparisons to rousseau’s social contract theory (gilbert 1989, 198, 206, 415-6; 
2008: chapters 4, 5 and 10). at best such voluntarism creates a theory that is 
bias towards the ideal of western, democratic societies, and at worst it avoids, 
trivialises or removes from investigation families, organisations and societies 
that are repressive, coercive or dictatorial.
at a theoretical level, such distortions may see m harmless, but gilbert’s 
primary aim is to develop a collectivity concept that can be applied in the 
social sciences (gilbert 1989, 2-3), and which can be extended to (at least) 
sociology, anthropology, political philosophy and psychology (gilbert 1989, 
436-41). indeed, such distortion is carried over into gilbert’s more recent 
work developing a Pst account of political obligation (2008). the Pst account 
argues that membership to a group is always at some level intentional (2008: 
168), that any form of government can be backed by joint commitment 
(2008,  180) and that a population has an obligation to comply with political 
institutions whatever they are (2008,  256). as such, these distortions should be 
taken seriously.
Primarily, i focus on conversation as an example of the formation of the 
plural subject. i combine contemporary linguistics with gilbert’s theory, to 
show there is a circularity inherent in her notion of plural subject-hood (§2). 
i argue against gilbert’s objections that language is an asocial phenomenon 
(§3), and suggest in conclusion that the best way to break the circularity in 
question is to concede that society is not a plural subject (§4). throughout, 
i attack the notion of the atomic individual, and suggest that instead, Pst 
should take the already socialised individual as its primary investigative unit.
When discussing the formation of plural subjects, gilbert investigates how “normal 
human beings with whatever capacities these have” combine to form plural 
subjects, the proper referent of “we’’ (gilbert 1989, 175). this is methodological 
individualism in action: an investigation into how human agents outside of a 
plural subject combine to form one. i focus on the example of conversation for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is an oft used example (gilbert 1989, 170, 200, 410, 433; gilbert 
2008, 101, 118, 173) of the small and “ephemeral” (gilbert 1989, 215) nature of 
the social groups gilbert investigates. secondly, gilbert makes it a requirement 
that agents must have “made certain things clear” (gilbert 1989, 162), prior to 
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communication prior to the plural subject, or for conversation to be the primary 
plural subject. this being the case, problems with conversational plural subject-
hood will resonate through gilbert’s theory.
there are four stages to the formation of the plural subject, each of which 
must be met in turn for the plural subject to be formed: 
1. Quasi-readiness: each agent must be independently prepared 
or “set up” to engage in a joint action a with another agent. this is 
“a state or disposition of the will, a kind of readiness to act when 
appropriate conditions obtain” (gilbert 1989, 186).
2. Common Knowledge: the quasi-readiness of each participant must 
be communicated, must be what gilbert terms “open*” (asserting 
that humans have the concept of “openness*” by default (gilbert 
1989, 191)). “it is common knowledge among a, B and c that p, if and 
only if (by definition) the fact that p is open* to A, B and C, and (2) A, 
B and c have noticed this” (gilbert 1989, 195).
3. Joint readiness: an addition of (1) and (2): “a set of persons are jointly 
ready to share in action a in circumstances C if and only if it is common 
knowledge among them that they have mutually expressed their 
quasi-readiness so to share” (gilbert 1989, 198).
4. Pooling Wills: this is the creation of a plural subject: “[o]ne who 
expresses quasi-readiness to do a in c in effect volunteers his will for a 
pool of wills to be set up so that in certain circumstances, that pool 
will be dedicated to a certain end” (gilbert 1989, 198)5.
With these stages in mind, i turn to a contemporary theory of 
communication, relevance theory (rt), forwarded by sperber and 
Wilson (1986/1995). in rt communication occurs by a speaker making 
information accessible in the audience’s “cognitive environment”. the 
cognitive environment is a combination of the agent’s cognitive abilities (the 
biological, perceptual, linguistic and conceptual abilities that agent has) 
with the physical/sensory environment that agent is located in. the cognitive 
environment is the set of facts and assumptions accessible or “manifest” to 
the individual. communication occurs in the overlap between two or more 
cognitive environments. it works by making certain things mutually manifest, 
which is a useful way of thinking of gilbert’s “openness*” requirement (see  
sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, 36-45).
5  more recent incarnations of Pst keep these distinct stages (gilbert 2008, 96).
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the combination of the two theories is illuminating. to begin a conversation, 
agents must be receptive and ready to engage one (1). this quasi-readiness 
must be communicated in order to attain (2) and (3). rt, as an ostensive 
theory of communication, see s any act of communication as carrying with 
it a necessary recognition of the participant’s intention to communicate. 
communication is not accidental; by beginning to communicate we make our 
readiness to communicate mutually manifest. something mutually manifest 
is common knowledge (2)6. the overlapping of cognitive environments 
is an excellent account of “joint readiness” (3). this creation of a mutual 
cognitive environment perhaps explains gilbert’s contention that we need to 
be considered an “us” in a sense before we embark on a full “pooling of wills” 
and a shared goal (“i suggest that a and B must need to be in a position 
appropriately to think of themselves as ‘us’ in order for a to intelligibly to 
set out to tell B something” (gilbert 1989, 215)). the two agents can then 
embark on the joint goal: to converse (4) (gilbert 1989, 170). conversing is the 
manipulation of this shared cognitive environment, the making mutually 
manifest certain facts, assumptions, problems, and so on.
this account transfers to non-conversational joint action. take moving 
a sofa together. the sofa must be manifest in my individual cognitive 
environment as something that i am ready to move with you (1). i must then 
make this intention manifest to you, and vice versa (2). the fact that this 
is manifest to both of us means it is mutually manifest – we have created an 
overlap of cognitive environments (3) and can proceed to the joint action of 
moving the sofa together (4).
considering contemporary theories of communication sheds much light on 
Gilbert’s account. RT not only fits with PST, but it elaborates the notions of 
communication that Pst requires for its account of plural subject formation 
to be plausible. however, rt works on the basis that communication 
presupposes a commonality in cognitive abilities which allows participant’s 
cognitive environments to be similar enough for overlap to occur. such 
cognitive abilities are usually considered linguistic or conceptual and require 
a society to bestow such commonality. For Pst a society is a plural subject, 
and so for the formation of a plural subject to presuppose society would entail 
circularity. to avoid this circularity, Pst must show that the cognitive abilities 
required for plural subject formation are asocial.
6  common knowledge is a complex topic, but i take it this rt account of common knowledge 
can be successfully applied to most, eg lewis (1969, 52-57).
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For a plausible assessment of Gilbert’s methodology, one must first 
distinguish what cognitive abilities an asocial human agent would possess, 
and what such an agent can only gain through societal interaction. searle 
(1995 , 127-47) distinguishes between deep and local “Background” in this 
regard, using the terminology to separate the capacities and abilities we 
have naturally (deep) and those which we have culturally (local). though 
searle focuses on capacities, abilities and predispositions, i focus solely on 
which concepts (or “cognitive abilities”) can be considered to be natural. it is 
the placement of certain concepts into deep or local Background which is 
crucial to this discussion7.
deciding which concepts are natural, and which cultural, is a matter of 
discussion and discovery8. But, to prevent us from simply placing concepts 
where our theories need them to be, we can present certain feasible criteria. 
i suggest that the primary candidates for “natural” concepts would be (i) 
something which can be said to arise from the ordinary use of our biological 
and/or sensorimotor abilities. lakoff and Johnston (1980, 56-60) call these 
naturally emergent concepts, and suggest spacial and temporal concepts as 
paradigm cases (uP, doWn, ForWard etc.). to this i would add (ii) concepts 
which could arise through the perception of and interaction with a non 
social environment (light and darK, perhaps day and night or natural 
kinds such as mountain). deep Background will contain the concepts that 
are indicated by these criteria. local Background will contain the concepts we 
can only gain by virtue of being in any society, or a particular society.
the majority of gilbert’s dyadic examples presuppose conversation, and 
thus language. i will assume, for the moment, that a language presumes 
a society (see  §3). What possible plural subject-hood is possible without 
language? that is, what shared cognitive environments are possible? if i teleport 
a tribesman from a tribe as yet unaccountably and blissfully ignorant 
of Western culture, could i get him to enter into a plural subject with 
the simple joint intention to move a sofa? see ing as we share only deep 
Background, how could i communicate my intent, and so get from quasi-
7  I borrow Searle’s terminology but not his notion. There are deep flaws in Searle’s conception 
which I do not wish to inherit. Suffice to say, I am committed to at least a significant part of the 
Background being conceptual and linguistic, which searle’s non-representational Background 
does not allow for.
8  i am drawing a theoretical line here, not an actual one. it see ms “local” Background will 
always shape and effect “deep” Background. recent empirical data shows that different cultures 
have radically differing conceptions of see mingly asocial concepts such as sPace (nisbett and 
miyamoto 2005). mallon et al (2009) recently used such evidence to argue against contemporary 
philosophy’s reliance on intuition, an argument which would find much purchase in Gilbert’s 
theory. 
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readiness (1) to a plural subject (4)? Perhaps by some fluke of gesture, or by 
virtue of recognition of shared deep Background, i could make my intention 
mutually manifest, and so entreat him to “join forces”  (gilbert 1989, 163). 
Beyond this most rudimentary physical joint action, what actions could we 
participate in without significant education on his part or mine?
the majority of gilbert’s dyadic examples presuppose that agents have 
previously been in a society, which is even more of a problem. the teleported 
tribesman and i shared one salient piece of local Background: that we both 
had a local Background. We were both born and raised within a society. if i 
instead teleport a Wildman, who has never before see n a human soul, how 
would i go about entering into a plural subject with him? Would he know 
what it is to cooperate or communicate? had i accidently teleported him into a 
tiger’s pen, and was forced to communicate the salient fact that there was a 
tiger sneaking up on him from behind, could i? communication relies on the 
recognition of intention. Would the Wildman have even this concept? Would 
he know that my desperate gestures and shouts were the act of a human 
agent intended to convey something? Judging from the prior criteria, the 
answer would be no. Cooperation, communication, recognition of intention, each 
necessary to even begin thinking about joint intention (1), have no reason to 
emerge spontaneously in the Wildman’s deep Background. We would have to 
(somehow) embark on a great deal of education before this poor man and i 
could even begin to make things mutually manifest to one another. But what 
would this education be if not socialisation?
this then, is my central point: in order for Pst to work it must presuppose 
that participants are (or have been) inhabitants of a larger, societal, plural 
subject. in order for Pst to describe anything but the most rudimentary 
joint actions, it must presuppose participants live in the same, or relevantly 
similar societies. simply put: the more cognitive overlap we share, the more 
joint actions we can engage in, and the easier it is to form a plural subject. if 
there is no cognitive overlap, we cannot engage in the formation of a plural 
subject. 
gilbert is quite comfortable with the notion that conversation (gilbert 
1989, 154), or at least communication broadly construed (gilbert 1989, 
215), is prior to and required for group formation. this does not lead to a 
“paradox” for gilbert, who see s the possibility of a linguistic social isolate 
quite plausible (gilbert 1989, 217, see  §3). however, what investigating Pst 
through the lens of contemporary communicative theory has revealed is 
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that all communication requires an overlap of “cognitive environment” 
which requires salient commonalities in the Background. Pst cannot 
account for shared Background without presupposing that the inhabitants 
already inhabit a social collective of the type Pst was meant to explain. 
What this circularity reveals is that for Pst to work it needs, and in some 
sense already takes, the notion of an already socialised individual as its 
primary methodological unit, rather than the atomic individual. i now turn 
to objections to the claim that communication is necessarily social, before 
sketching a non-circular PST in the final section.
the plural subject theorist could answer my accusation of circularity with 
two objections. Firstly, one might say that a participant does not need to 
have inhabited a society (or other plural subject) in order to form a plural 
subject. a participant needs only the concept of a plural subject. on this 
claim the concept of a plural subject is hard-wired into us, part of our deep 
Background. gilbert suggests that the benevolent creator of the epigraph 
would need to bestow “an innate concept of a plural subject” (gilbert 1989, 
167), or a certain kind of “mutual recognition” (gilbert 1989, 217) to move 
from an asocial state to a social one. the role this innate concept of plural 
subject-hood plays in group formation is implicit through most of gilbert’s 
work, but occasionally emerges explicitly:
i do, of course, posit a mechanism for the construction, so to speak, of social 
groups. and this mechanism can only work if everyone has a grasp of a subtle 
conceptual scheme, the conceptual scheme of plural subjects. given that all 
have this concept, then the basic means for bringing plural subject-hood into 
being is at our disposal (gilbert 1989, 416).
gilbert needs to assert the nativism of a plural subject concept because it is 
the only way her account of group formation can work without circularity. 
there is no argumentation for this position, only assertion. i assume that 
we cannot simply assert innate concepts to save our philosophical system 
unless we have a reasonable causal story for how they would emerge 
naturally. such an assertion is certainly not a defence against a claim that it 
is the methodology which creates the theoretical gaps which these nativist 
assertions are made to plug.
“Plural subjecthood”, as a concept, does not meet the criteria i sketched 
above for naturally emergent concepts. it is not a result of our sensorimotor 
abilities, and an asocial agent has no need or ability to produce it in 
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the concept must just be a “given”. the burden is on gilbert to explicitly 
argue why this is the case. moreover, assume for a moment that gilbert is 
correct. asserting that human beings have an innate concept of collectivity 
is tantamount to asserting that human beings, qua human beings, are 
social creatures. human beings have evolved within, or are otherwise 
specifically adapted for, social groups. Why then should philosophy take as 
the methodological unit of investigation an atomic and asocial human? is it 
not bound to create distortions in a theory if the primary methodological 
unit is an animal outside of the habitat it is adapted to, a human normally 
considered at best an oddity and at worst pathological?
the second, more substantial objection that the plural subject theorist could 
offer is the assertion that language is not necessarily social. if language is 
not necessarily social, then the fact that communication is necessary for 
plural subject formation does not have to be circular. gilbert clearly saw how 
crucial it was for Pst to develop an asocial theory of language, dedicating a 
whole chapter to the task (gilbert 1989, 58-146). this chapter is split between 
attacking Wittgensteinian arguments against private language, and asserting 
a Pst account of group language formation. here i pick out only one strand of 
the argument: the congenital Crusoe intuition. The congenital Crusoe figure 
is a social isolate with full grasp of a private language. For gilbert’s account 
of language to function this figure must be plausible. Moreover, this fully 
functioning but socially isolated individual is precisely the atomistic individual 
which I am arguing against. If this figure is plausible, then the methodology in 
question is unproblematic.
The Crusoe figure, perhaps because it is presupposed in her methodology, is a 
conceptual certainty for gilbert: 
the claim ... that it is logically impossible to have a language if one has not 
participated in group life ... [is] counterintuitive on the face of it. it appears we can 
at least conceive of a congenital Crusoe – a being socially isolated throughout his 
life – who was initially endowed with, or invented, a language of his own (gilbert 
1989, 59).
gilbert assures us this is pre-theoretical or “untutored” intuition. it is “intuitive” 
for her that this figure can use language (Gilbert 1989, 73), and often if an opposing 
argument reaches the “counter-intuitive” “anti-crusoe conclusion” then this 
“counts against it” (gilbert 1989, 89-90), and one should become “immediately 
suspicious” (gilbert 1989, 95) of such a theory. this intuition works as a motivating 
feature also: on developing what she finds to be an “intuitive” or “natural” model 
of language (gilbert 1989, 93-4) – essentially Platonic – “one datum” in its favour is 
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its avoidance of the anti-crusoe conclusion (gilbert 1989, 95).
The first question is to ask is whether the Crusoe figure is in anyway actually 
possible. recent empirical evidence suggests that it is not. evidence indicates 
that children who do not learn language during the “critical period” of 
development (around 3-13) do not develop full linguistic ability (Pinker 1994: 
38-9). Without learning a language within this period, we lose the ability to 
learn any language completely, even when subsequently placed in a linguistic 
environment (Pinker 1994, 290-2). Pinker cites the case of “genie”, a so 
called “wolf-child” who was discovered at the age of 13. genie was without 
language and severely impaired in her ability to learn one (Pinker 1994, 291). 
generative linguistics suggests that though we have a biological ability to 
develop language when in a linguistic environment, and within a certain key 
time frame, children that cannot interact with a language during this time 
cannot and do not develop one independently, spontaneously or by intellectual 
effort alone. though gilbert’s argument is primarily conceptual rather than 
empirical, i suggest we should at least be sensitive to empirical facts in our 
theorising, especially when developing concepts for use in the social sciences. 
Though the Crusoe figure may be a conceptual possibility, it is not a nomological 
possibility.
Indeed, the Crusoe figure may not be as conceptually possible as gilbert thinks. 
When imagining the conceptual Crusoe figure, one imagines a socialised 
individual, like us, but without society. of course it see ms plausible that such a 
figure could develop language independently. Equally, if we picture the social 
isolate as just like us but outside of society, it see ms very plausible to imagine 
that they could form groups with ease when other humans are introduced. now 
try and consider someone with only deep Background. is it plausible that this 
person would spontaneously develop the tendency to attribute signs to objects? 
can a human entrenched in society imagine the mental life of someone who 
has never before interacted with another human? it would be, doubtless, not at 
all like us. In order to even ascertain whether the Crusoe figure is conceivable, a 
great deal more fleshing out of this figure is required by Gilbert9. 
despite empirical invalidity, and conceptual inadequacy, gilbert perhaps 
deserves an answer as to why she finds the Crusoe-figure so intuitive. I 
take it that gilbert’s view, and that of Winch whom she argues against, fall 
down either side of the same hurdle. Winch gives us an individual incapable 
of intentional action outside of society. this is clearly undesirable, but in 
response gilbert gives us an individual with a fully functioning vocabulary 
9  considering gilbert’s earlier paper on asocial language (1983), sharrock and anderson have 
a similar response: “doubting whether someone can invent a language for themselves involves 
raising rather more deep and complex questions than those which can be met by the response 
‘Well, i can imagine someone doing it!’” (1986, 554).
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and conceptual apparatus, despite having never see n another soul. this 
is an equally radical view. i suggest that if we make a simple distinction, 
between concept and language, we gain a much more feasible picture. With 
this the appeal of the private language argument falls away. If one conflates 
concept, language and intention (gilbert 1989, 68), the conceptual crusoe 
argument becomes more plausible simply because it is unintuitive to deny 
the Crusoe figure all of these. But separate concept and language and one 
finds that we can have a plausible Crusoe figure possessing concepts and 
intention (with deep Background) but not necessarily language (without local 
Background). Gilbert requires an argument for a conflation which is simply 
assumed.
the account of group language formation that gilbert gives is very similar 
to the plural subject formation already looked at. it simply involves social 
isolates, each with their own private language, figuring out what words 
they shall use publically (gilbert 1989, 132-142). language formation, like 
group formation, is voluntaristic and intentional10. it only makes sense if 
we already assume the linguistic capacities of the social isolate. gilbert 
then begs the question when she assumes that the congenital crusoe “has a 
language”. against a similar accusation gilbert answers:
if we start from the standpoint of what is acceptable intuitively, however, there is 
no need of an argument to show that those who write off language-using isolates 
have no right to do so. in other words, this question may indeed be begged, until 
it is shown that such statements are incoherent or otherwise inadmissible. more 
precisely, some flaw must be clearly shown in the picture [of congenital Crusoe] that 
i have sketched (gilbert 1989, 99).
such a statement amounts to little more than an assertion that her intuition 
is correct. i am now in a position to answer the challenge here laid out with 
not one but three “flaws” in the congenital Crusoe conception. Firstly, it goes 
against contemporary empirical evidence. secondly, it is not conceptually 
motivating without more work. thirdly, it rests without argument on a 
conflation of concept and language. Though it is plausible to assume that 
humans are conceptual and intentional creatures outside of society, there is 
no reason to think that they are linguistic or communicative creatures outside 
of society, which is what gilbert needed to provide to avoid the circularity 
10  chomsky, in particular, has staunchly denied the empiricist conception that language 
formation is an intellectual achievement, preferring the notion that it is akin to organ growth 
(see  Pinker 1994, 297-332). chomsky’s ‘poverty of the stimulus’ argument focuses on why it is 
implausible to consider language an intellectual creation (see  chomsky 1980, 310-24 and 2000, 
3-19; cook 1991; Pinker 1994, 262-297). 
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I identified. This places the burden of proof rather forcibly back onto the 
plural subject theorist.
This examination of the implausibility of the congenital Crusoe figure doubles 
as an argument against methodological atomism. taking an empirically 
impossible and conceptually flawed unit as the basic building block of a theory 
is going to lead to the distortions i have illuminated, and (no doubt) others. 
once again i suggest that what Pst and other theories of social ontology 
require as the primary methodological unit is the already socialised individual. 
this amounts to accepting the circularity i have shown. Plural subjects 
require an already present collectivity for their formation. In the final section 
i offer one plausible way for Pst to diffuse this circularity, and the distortions 
the methodology entails11.
the primary methodological unit needed for Pst to work must be the already 
socialised individual. as this is conceptually and nomologically plausible, i 
take it to be preferable to that which it replaces: the non-plausible atomic 
individual that much philosophy of society presupposes. this ultimately 
amounts to little more than the argument that we should take human 
beings as they have always existed – as entrenched in social reality – as our 
primary investigative unit in the social sciences12. i take it such a position 
would be uncontentious if it wasn’t for the circularity which it apparently 
11  in order to clarify the argument here it will serve to compare it with the useful distinctions put 
forward by Pettit (1993). Pettit suggests that there are two separate issues that are often conflated in social 
ontology: the individualism/collectivism issue (1993, chap 3), and the atomism/holism issue (1993, chap 
4). the collectivism/individualism question revolves around whether our intentional agency is impaired 
by social regularities (the collectivist position), or unimpaired (the individualist position). as i understand 
it my paper is neutral on this issue. i am concerned here about the issue of voluntarism only in as far as it 
pertains to the suggestion that we in some real sense choose to enter the society or family we find ourselves 
in. i am neutral here as to whether our ability to act autonomously within these social groups is impaired 
in any way. this being said, i think there are many issues that come to the fore when we consider our lack 
of choice in this regard, which may affect our autonomy. Pettit avoids these questions by narrowing his 
investigation to “autarchy”, or the minimal requirements for an agent having rational intentional states 
(1993, 120). it may surprise the reader to learn that the paper is also neutral on the atomism/holism issue, 
at least as it is described by Pettit. Pettit’s concern is whether interaction with others is required for full 
human rationality (the holist position), or whether an asocial creature can develop full rationality outside 
of human interaction (the atomist position) (1993; 1998). though we both argue against atomism, we do 
so for different reasons. it may be plausible to suggest that a truly asocial individual is still fully capable of 
thinking, even if impaired in any number of other ways. i have suggested that an asocial individual would 
still have the resources to be an intentional individual (“i see  no way of arguing that a robinson crusoe, 
even a robinson crusoe isolated from birth, could not think or follow rules” (Pettit 1993, 179)). the point 
at issue within this paper is whether or not such an asocial individual would have the cognitive resources 
to form, or participate within, a social group. the answer to that, i have argued, is no. in this sense i am a 
holist about group formation and participation, even if i am not (necessarily), one about human rationality. 
there is, no doubt, reason to believe that holism about one leads to holism about the other, but this is a 
discussion best left for another day.
12  the position i have arrived at here is, as i take it, not dissimilar to the intuitions relating to embedded 
individuals which drive the phenomenological investigations of (for instance) heidegger and merleau-
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entails. So I now finalise by sketching a non-circular and non-distorted 
research possibility for Pst.
i suggest that the simplest way to break the circularity inherent in gilbert’s 
Pst is to deny that society is a plural subject. this is not to say that Pst 
doesn’t pick out an interesting, important and useful notion for the social 
sciences. it is to deny that all the social sciences need is Pst, or that all social 
groups are plural subjects (gilbert 1989, 413; 2008, chapter 8). Pst describes 
exactly what it proclaims to describe: small, voluntaristic, united and self 
aware groups. social groups of the sort united by goals or actions. But, as 
argued above, a) such groups presuppose collectivity, so they cannot be the 
sole collectivity concept, and b) understanding all of society in terms of Pst 
leads to distortions such as voluntarism (1). 
so how does the formation of a society work, if it is not described by Pst? i take 
it this is a question that philosophy of society does not have to answer: human 
beings and society evolved together, and the two are inextricable in a real 
sense. a human (somehow) born or raised outside of social interaction is – as 
poor genie shows – severely linguistically, socially and emotionally disabled. 
the question should not be “how do societies form, given atomic individuals?” 
but rather “how do societies function and develop given the interactions of 
embedded individuals?”
so what is society, if it is not a plural subject? Well, this is hardly a question i 
am expected to answer here, but this exegesis of Pst gives some idea of how to 
move forward. society is not a “social contract” (gilbert 1989, 198) in the way 
that rousseau and Pst formulate. society is something we are born into, not 
something we choose. society is better understood as the systems, structures, 
institutions and hierarchies in place. these affect those individuals born into 
the environment by shaping their subjective values, expectations, language 
and concepts: creating the local Background. already socialised individuals 
who share overlapping Backgrounds are capable of forming plural subjects. 
Plural subjects are the agents of group action within a society. society is not a 
plural subject, but a different kind of collectivity which is the pre-condition of 
plural subjecthood. society is not a plural subject but a system of overlapping 
and interacting plural subjecthoods. this is the merest suggestion, but 
shows how one might progress in incorporating Pst into a less distorted 
investigation of social interactions.
in response to this picture, the plural subject theorist might offer two 
objections. The first is to claim that our society does show distinctive “plural 
subject” tendencies, where the population as a whole has collective goals or 
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actions. a prime example often given is voting13. this could be construed as a 
more normative claim: “okay”, the plural subject theorist may concede, “most 
actual societies are not plural subjects. But they ought to be plural subjects, 
on the basis of our common collectivity concepts, when they are functioning 
properly”14. this would then be a theory which distinguishes between political 
institutions at the theoretic level, and can only recognise and investigate 
more (idealised) democratic societies as social groups. this would mean that 
the vast majority of existent societies could not be investigated by the social 
sciences, which is not a desirable consequence15.
the second objection stems from gilbert’s investigation of the “Kafkaesque” 
company. such an organisation – full of employees unaware of one another 
and without collective thought – is simply not a “social group or human 
collectivity” on gilbert’s account (gilbert 1989, 231). the analogous society 
would be an incredibly dictatorial or repressive regime. if one reads gilbert 
as saying that the alienating organisation and dictatorial regime are not social 
groups then the above criticisms apply. if one reads gilbert as saying they are 
not plural subjects then this essentially agrees with my claim: many (most) 
societies and organisations are not plural subjects.
i conclude that methodological atomism leads to distortions in Pst, which are 
overcome when the atomic individual is denied. Without this atomic individual 
the voluntaristic plural subject model of society is no longer plausible. a 
narrowed but undistorted Pst is then free to describe the formation and 
activity of voluntaristic social groups embedded within society. A final note is 
required for the plural subject theorist who may concede that I have identified 
and overcome the circularity and distortion within Pst, but at too high a 
cost. For the picture now is a truly un-voluntaristic account, an account that 
is in danger of losing the agency the original model granted the individual 
by definition. In response, I suggest that this is not a theoretical problem, 
but a practical one. individual agency within a collectivity is not a given, but 
something which must be strived for, part of that “ancient problem of how to 
live” (gilbert 1989, 436)16.
13  considering the percentage of the population that actually votes decreases with each 
election, i believe the claim that society is functioning as a plural subject at these times is not 
without significant empirical problems.
14  gilbert (2008, 180-181) offers a similar suggestion.
15  i leave open the possibility that our common collectivity concept is that of the plural 
subject, and that society is not a plural subject, but through misapplication or even manipulation 
we often mistakenly think of society in plural subject terms.
16  a shorter version of this paper was delivered at the Collective intentionality Viii conference 
(manchester, 2012), and i am grateful to the comments which it received. i am indebted to 
dominic gregory and especially Joseph Kisolo-ssonko for their assistance with earlier drafts.
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